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THE POLITICS OF THE PANDEMIC 
 
In the developing aftermath of the coronavirus pandemic, both British and global politics face 
a range of urgent and drastic challenges. The unprecedented global health crisis been the 
catalyst for some extreme social, political and economic repercussions, with President Trump 
comparing it to a conflict with an ‘invisible enemy’, while the British media has made parallels 
with historical periods of wartime endeavour while referencing the ‘spirit of the blitz’. Within 
such an uncertain scenario, the future alignment and direction of Britain’s global status and 
key international relationships has become a pressing priority, which has been evident in 
various key speeches by Boris Johnson regarding future trading relations with the 
superpowers of the USA and China in particular, and specifically illustrated by controversial 
decisions involving Huawei’s access to the UK’s phone network. Relations with both of these 
superpowers was already of heightened importance for the UK government within the 
context of the post-Brexit political environment, but increasingly more so in the pandemic’s 
wake.   
 
The coronavirus (Covid-19) outbreak can certainly be viewed as a major turning point 
of the past century, with a case to be made that it potentially transcends all previous 
comparative events (e.g. wars, recessions, terrorism) in terms of its broader destructive 
impact. This consequently represents a particularly severe challenge to the leading politicians 
and great powers in both domestic and foreign policy spheres. Indeed, the credibility and 
capability of such contemporary global leaders and various key institutions has been placed 
under intense public scrutiny during this crisis. On a broader structural level, the fall-out from 
the pandemic could also radically recalibrate the global political order, with countries 
potentially rising and falling in status in the pandemic’s wake. This has been a notable 
consequence of previous international events of such significant magnitude, e.g. the 
emergence of the Cold War after 1945.  Within such a context, there has been speculation as 
to whether the steadily narrowing hierarchical gap between the USA and China will finally be 
eclipsed due to such tumultuous events. There would be some irony in such a possible 
development, as it could ultimately result in China steadily assuming a heightened global 
ascendancy, which would be controversial given that the origins of the pandemic’s outbreak 




 We can subsequently analyse the pandemic’s impact from a number of political 
perspectives as follows: (1) The impact on UK domestic politics, (2) The impact on foreign 
policy and international institutions, (3) The impact on the international structure and global 
politics. 
 
The impact on UK domestic politics 
 
Following the first reported cases in China in late 2019, by mid-2020 it was reported that 
approximately 14 million people across the world had been infected by coronavirus, with the 
death toll 600,000 and rising. This rapid escalation has meant few countries have been spared 
from its impact, with many evidently surprised by the speed of the pandemic reaching their 
shores, and experiencing similar ‘lockdown’ difficulties in tackling the outbreak. With 
unemployment subsequently booming on a wider international scale, there are clearly global 
trends in play.  Yet in the UK, Boris Johnson’s Conservative administration has faced specific 
criticism for being notably unprepared in comparison to elsewhere. In addition to this, it has 
been estimated that given the UK’s comparatively high death rate, alongside the specific 
nature of its economy (namely its focus on the service/hospitality sector), that the impact of 
the coronavirus pandemic could be notably worse than other afflicted nations in both human 
and economic terms. The virus outbreak could therefore be the catalyst for Britain’s worst 
recession in approximately 300 years1, with a record drop in GDP recorded in April 2020, and 
escalating unemployment likely to exceed the most recent global depression of 2008-9 and 
during recurring periods of recession in the 1980s. The steep surge in UK unemployment and 
subsequent fall in economic output is predicted to take decades to recover from, creating 
bleak prospects particularly for younger age groups who’ve been disproportionately affected 
in the immediate socio-economic fall-out. The somewhat generous yet expensive 
commitment to furloughing employees of various affected businesses, as well as the 
inevitably expanding welfare expenditure, will create further longer-term economic problems 
for the country.  
 
 This grim scenario has therefore clearly created major political challenges for the 
government of the day, and some have defended frontline politicians in grappling with what 
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is a ‘poisoned chalice’ and an emergency situation that few others have ever faced. However, 
in various ways the Johnson administration does initially appear to have been found wanting. 
Specifically, with Britain recording what has been established as the highest numerical death 
toll in the whole of Europe, it is apparent that the existing domestic political processes were 
ill-prepared for such a pandemic, raising serious questions about the manner in which it has 
practically dealt with the outbreak. Indeed, in a similar vein to the criticism aimed at Donald 
Trump in the USA, various public remarks and actions by Boris Johnson during early 2020 have 
been highlighted to support allegations that he didn’t take the threat of coronavirus seriously 
in the global outbreak’s initial phase2. Subsequent policies such as the comparatively delayed 
lockdown, lack of patient testing facilities, and shortage of various medical equipment have 
added weight to such criticisms. 
 
While there has rightly been much praise for the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) in 
responding to the pandemic, there have nevertheless been significant concerns expressed 
about the lack of personal protective equipment (PPE) available to those working on the 
medical frontline- resulting in over 200 British health workers subsequently dying. Such 
medical shortages have also been a factor in how the disease has rampaged through the 
country’s care homes, which have suffered an approximate quarter of all UK coronavirus 
deaths.  To critics, this reflects further evidence of fundamental structural problems within 
the country’s domestic political framework, while also suggesting that a decade of austerity 
came home to roost in 2020. Serious questions have therefore been asked about how well-
resourced the government machine was in terms of protecting its most vulnerable citizens 
from such an outbreak, with such criticisms heightened in the context of revelations of 
previous warnings dating back to 2016 that such a pandemic was likely to occur (Operation 
Cygnus), and which the Conservative government has been accused of ignoring. 
 
The impact on foreign policy and international institutions 
 
Global leadership at both an individual and institutional level has also been subject to much 
scrutiny during the initial months of the coronavirus pandemic. Within the context of foreign 
policy, the international relations theory known as ‘neoliberal institutionalism’ argues that 
global bodies and institutions will tend to positively generate co-operation and improve 
4 
 
relations between states. This reflects a more positive view of both human nature and the 
dynamics of the international order. On the basic premise of this liberal perspective therefore, 
key bodies such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) should ideally work together alongside nation states for the common 
good in a constructive, co-operative and stabilising manner.  
 
However there have been various concerns expressed as to how these bodies have co-
ordinated their efforts and engaged with leading nation states in reacting to the coronavirus 
outbreak. As a high-profile example of such difficulties, President Trump has repeatedly 
attacked the WHO, which he alleges (in its role as a key UN agency) has positioned itself too 
closely to China and not sufficiently questioned about how and why the virus originated in 
the manner that it did. Trump subsequently threatened to withhold American funds from the 
WHO, called for it to “clean up its act”, and eventually announced plans for the USA to leave 
the body.  There have also been criticisms of how the European Union has co-ordinated its 
response to the outbreak, specifically how it reacted sluggishly to the worst cases within its 
jurisdiction, in particular regarding the high death toll in northern Italy during the earliest 
phase of the crisis. Indeed, within this context of such global institutional disarray, NGOs such 
as Amnesty International have voiced concerns about how such failings have resulted in 
specific groups across all societies being disproportionately affected in health terms by the 
pandemic- particularly the poorest, the oldest, and BAME communities. Such trends reflect 
inherent inequalities and a lack of global social justice, which both various international 
institutions and leading states must take collective responsibility for such evident failure in 
foreign policy terms. 
 
From Britain’s perspective, while the country is traditionally perceived as one of the 
leading world nations and economies (fuelled by its imperial past and reputation), in recent 
times it has struggled to influence global foreign policy, and a liberal analysis of international 
relations would claim it is best served to do so by its membership of various global institutions. 
Yet Britain voted the leave the EU in 2016, and has subsequently more closely aligned itself 
in foreign policy terms with the USA, with Boris Johnson cultivating a close ‘special 
relationship’ with Donald Trump. However, the leadership qualities of both men amidst this 
crisis has been a cause of significant concern for many political observers, and this revived 
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alignment with the USA has generated further concerns regarding Britain’s future position of 
global influence. Given these specific developments, the coronavirus outbreak has also 
consequently resurrected anxieties from opponents of Brexit. They have highlighted 
perceived flaws in this re-emphasised Anglo-American connection, which in turn has led to 
lack of co-operation and poor communications between Britain and its geographical 
neighbours in the EU in the sharing of medical resources and equipment to tackle the 
pandemic3. Furthermore, many UK businesses have expressed concern that the urgent 
political demands created by the pandemic has clearly distracted attention from ongoing 
Brexit negotiations, making the prospect of a ‘no deal’ far more likely due to the stalled 
diplomacy on this matter. Prominent business groups such as the CBI have subsequently 
articulated collective commercial fears about how the toxic blend of the coronavirus outbreak 
and a no deal Brexit could be a most destructive eventuality, with calls arising for the 
transition period to be extended beyond the end of 20204.  
 
The impact on the international structure and global politics 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, various political commentators have observed the apparent 
rise and fall of American dominance and hegemony within the international arena. After an 
explicit ‘unipolar’ decade during the 1990s5 when US strength was at its maximum capacity 
in the wake of the Soviet Union’s demise, American global power seems to have diminished 
in relation to the rest of the world over the first two decades of the 21st century6. However, 
despite such fluid dynamics, the long-established American role as the premier global power 
appears to remain just about intact in terms of its economic, military and cultural status. Yet 
the extent of its hegemony of the 1990s has clearly faded, and the degree of relative American 
decline has been exposed by various booming economies ‘catching up’ from within the 
‘BRICS’ nations, and in particular China, which has recently enjoyed rapid growth in its 
economic power and global influence. 
 
 Consequently, a crucial potential consequence to arise from the pandemic’s outbreak 
is its likely impact on the international order, and whether the unipolarity of the 1990s will 
soon give way to either a resurrection of pre-1945 multipolarity, a renewed Cold War style 
bipolarity (between the USA and a rising China), or even in the longer term the possibility of 
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China as the dominant superpower. Within this context, how the major powers have dealt 
with the coronavirus outbreak could indeed prove critical to their longer-term global status. 
In particular, the somewhat complacent and casual nature of President Trump’s initial 
response to the coronavirus threat has resurrected further questions about the USA’s image 
and the extent of its relative decline on the world stage.  By contrast, the Chinese government 
of Xi Jinping appears to have responded more efficiently than most western states, arguably 
to limit any longer term damage to its own regime. This may well stem from its authoritarian 
culture and more disciplined domestic political structures, although there has been global 
scepticism as to the veracity of the information regarding numbers of coronavirus deaths and 
infections that China has published, leading to allegations of ‘cover-ups’ from President 
Trump. British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab has echoed such criticisms  and warmed that 
it will not be “business as usual” between the UK and China in the post-pandemic era. While 
the Huawei ruling seems to reflect this, Sino-British relations will be tempered in reality by 
vital mutual trading interests.  
 
 It therefore remains to be seen as to whether the pandemic’s most decisive impact 
will be the destruction of lingering US global hegemony, and also whether it has the potential 
to make the world a more dangerous and unstable place once the initial phase of the crisis 
subsides. This rather pessimistic viewpoint can be linked to neo-realist IR scholars such as 
John Mearsheimer7, who has claimed that various global events will conspire to make the 
eventual conclusion of China’s rapid rise far from peaceful. This can also be linked to 
associated theories of ‘hegemonic war’8, which claims that when one great (hegemonic) 
power falls and another threatens to replace it, then a military conflict is likely to resolve the 
new balance of power. Subsequently, such a realist outlook would warn that a prolonged 
moment of danger will exist in the pandemic’s aftermath, arising from whether a weakened 
USA will be more likely to aggressively strike out at China, either via political, economic or 
even military means. A more optimistic (liberal) view of international relations would 
however advocate that the sooner these two superpowers reconstitute mutually vital trading 
relations via a process of complex yet peaceful interdependence, then a violent or destructive 
outcome to their international relationship is far less likely.   
 




As the world adjusts to the ‘new normal’ in the wake of the pandemic’s destructive outbreak, 
further challenges undoubtedly lie ahead for political leaders, key political institutions and 
globalised political structures. Pre-existing disputes between the superpowers have been 
heightened by the crisis and continue to simmer, with events in Hong Kong currently at the 
epicentre of such Sino-western tensions. Politics and political processes have ultimately 
struggled to adapt to the demands imposed by the pandemic, and various criticisms have 
been particularly directed towards how both domestic and foreign policy-making has been 
implemented across the international community and within interconnected nation states. 
Arising from such observations, it has been consequently highlighted by various 
commentators that the pandemic has the considerable potential to irrevocably alter the 
international balance of power, with significant implications for the structure of global politics 
in the long-term. The interconnecting dynamics between these three spheres of politics; 
namely domestic policy, foreign policy, and the international structure, have been fully 
exposed by this crisis, which clearly illustrates how each political sphere functions and 
interacts with the other.      
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